Eagle Fire Consolidation Study 2017

Report Authors

• Matthew May, PhD, Postdoctoral Associate
• Greg Hill, PhD, Director

This report was prepared by Idaho Policy Institute at Boise State University and commissioned the Eagle Fire Protection District Commission

Recommended citation: May, M., Hill, G. (2017). Eagle Fire Consolidation Study 2017. Idaho Policy Institute. Boise, ID: Boise State University.

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Executive Summary

The Eagle Fire Commission contracted with the Idaho Policy Institute (IPI) to conduct a study of a proposal to enter into a fire protection contract-for-service with the Boise Fire Department. Guided by the research question, “What are the impacts of Eagle fire service consolidation with Boise Fire Department?” IPI conducted a literature review, financial analysis, and stakeholder analysis regarding the proposal. On the basis of these analyses, IPI reports the following findings:

• Parties to a fire service consolidation must be committed to its success
• Regardless of the outcome, open and transparent communication is necessary in order to achieve stakeholder and community buy-in on the final decision
• It is better to evaluate consolidations on the basis of added value rather than economies of scale, which do not always materialize in fire service consolidations
• The contract-for-service’s annual rate of increase matters a great deal and will determine whether or not cost savings are realized
• Negotiating and monitoring the actual contract is critical
• It is possible to mitigate one-time costs to the Eagle Fire Protection District through negotiation
• Virtually all stakeholders feel that the effect on citizens should be the primary focus of any decision

These are the elements of IPI’s analysis that we feel are most important as the Eagle Fire Commission deliberates whether or not to proceed with the Boise Fire contract-for-service. We encourage the Commission to keep them in mind.

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Literature Review

What Others Have Done

We conducted a literature review of academic studies, third-party reports, and articles associated with local government consolidation, paying particular attention to studies that specifically dealt with fire service consolidation. This review included a wide array of studies that looked at consolidations across the country, including Alabama (Couch, King, Gossett, & Parris, 2004), New York (Duncombe & Yinger, 1993), California (Frazier, 1998), Wisconsin (Maher, 2015), Illinois (McGrath, 1995), Michigan (Bert, 2002), Nevada (Mellinger, Minton, & Driscoll, 2008), Kansas (Frazier, 1998), New Jersey (Public Safety Solutions, 2011), and Utah (Workman, 2004; Corroon, 2005). International studies at the sub-national level were also included in this review (Fox & Gurley, 2006; Vojnovic, 2000).

There are distinct types of consolidations. The literature divides them into three general categories: partial, functional, and full (Bert, 2002; Bradshaw, 2007). In partial consolidations, fire protection entities remain legally separate, but partner in the delivery of some specific functions usually in the form of mutual aid agreements. In functional consolidations (such as a contract-for-service), the two entities again remain legally separate. Each maintains ownership of their own facilities and equipment, but only one entity is responsible for staffing and service delivery. Finally, in full consolidations, the two entities dissolve and create a new, unified entity that is responsible for all former jurisdictions. The proposed contract-for-service contract between the Eagle Fire Protection District and the Boise Fire Department would constitute a functional consolidation.

Key Driver: Financial Necessity

Bradshaw (2007) notes that a key driver behind fire service consolidation is financial necessity. The literature suggests that consolidation is typically pursued in order to benefit from cost savings generated by economies of scale and the elimination of duplicative services. Proponents argue consolidation results in greater efficiency by unifying service delivery within one chain of command irrespective of existing political boundaries, thereby increasing the organization’s effectiveness (see Frazier, 1998; Bert, 2002; Workman, 2004; Bradshaw, 2007; & Maher, 2015).

Key Obstacle: Power

The primary obstacles to consolidation generally revolve around the concept of power—who has it, who will keep it, and who will lose it (McGrath, 1995; Frazier, 1998; and Bert, 2002). The literature suggests that resistance usually takes the form of turf battles. Other contributing factors include political differences, a lack of trust between entities, the history between the relevant entities, and the question of who will have control under the new system.

Elements for Successful Consolidation

Three major elements critical for the success of consolidations are: (1) Communication—all parties must be clear and open with each other throughout the process (Bert, 2002). (2) Involvement—all relevant stakeholders must be included at every step of the process, including the public, but especially any affected labor unions or local jurisdictions (Bert, 2002; Frazier, 1998; Workman, 2004). Finally, (3) Commitment to the vision—if the affected parties, especially their leadership, are not committed to the consolidation, it will likely fail. McGrath (1995) goes so far as to name this the most critical component, emphasizing “[T]he necessity for total commitment to the consolidation philosophy by both the local fire chiefs and their respective local community governing body offices. Without their unqualified support by these two entities, consolidation efforts are doomed to failure” (p. 5).

As already mentioned, the cost savings of access to economies of scale is one of the most commonly cited reasons to pursue consolidation. There is substantial disagreement in the literature over whether they actually exist. Couch et al (2004) examined municipal consolidations in 25 Alabama cities, ranging in population from approximately 18,000 to 253,000. Their study found no support for the argument that consolidation leads to economies of scale. Fox and Gurley (2006) examined consolidations at the subnational level in other countries and found that size economies were instead service specific—likely for services such as water or sewer delivery, but unlikely for services that had numerous small production units situated close to the populations they serve.

Maher (2015) notes that most studies of consolidation rely upon pre-consolidation expenditure reduction estimates without examining whether these estimates were actually borne out. Seeking to rectify this, Maher looks at local governments in Wisconsin that consolidated between 1987 and 2009. At the time of Maher’s study, Wisconsin included 110 consolidated fire departments, constituting approximately 13% of fire departments within the entire state. Maher finds that cost savings generally did not materialize for protective services (police and fire). That said, the consolidations were successful at providing enhanced services to citizens without significantly increasing costs (p. 412).

A possible explanation for this gap between the theoretical expectations surrounding consolidation and the reality is one of perspective. McGrath (1995), looking at the 33 fire protection organizations in Lake County, Illinois, suggests that consolidations do, in fact, reduce per unit costs for fire departments. Expanded service delivery, however, offset the savings and keep overall costs constant (p. 37). Bish (2001) notes that a population of 20,000 is the usual threshold at which economies of scale begin to disappear for most local government activities (p. 14). Similarly, Katsuyama observes that when consolidations occur, costs and wages generally “average up” to the higher of the consolidating entities, which can further offset cost savings (as reprinted in Mellinger et al, 2008, p. 14).

Collectively, the literature shows that the benefit of consolidation is very context-dependent. There are, indeed, benefits to realize, but added costs can offset them. There is no single answer. The challenge facing policy makers is weighing whether the added benefits in areas like service delivery justify the potential attendant costs, and, if so, managing the arrangement carefully.

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Financial Analysis

Methodology

In order to conduct a financial analysis of the contract-for-service proposal, we examined the Eagle Fire Protection District’s annual budgets for fiscal year (FY) 2013 through FY 2018, provided by Eagle Fire Command Staff. The budgets for FY 2013 through FY 2017 included actual expenditures, while FY 2018 (which has not yet begun as of this writing) only included budgeted expenditures. For our analysis, we modified the budgets for FY 2013 and FY 2014 to exclude revenue from the Star Fire Protection District and costs associated with Star Fire personnel and stations. This ensured that we had an accurate depiction of Eagle Fire-specific costs over time with which to evaluate the proposal.

Eagle Fire Command Staff provided an overview of which budget line items would be included as part of Boise Fire’s proposal and which line items would remain the responsibility of the Eagle Fire Protection District. This allowed us to approximate the relative share of Eagle Fire’s budget that Boise Fire would absorb in their contract price, detailed in a later section.

Budgets for FY 2013 and FY 2014 were less specific than later fiscal years. For example, Commissioners salaries—which remain the responsibility of Eagle Fire under the proposed contract-for-service—were not included as a separate line item. As the annual dollar amount for Commissioners salaries for both FY 2015 and FY 2016 was $3,375, we assumed this cost was constant through FY 2013 and FY 2014, as well. We calculated Boise Fire’s share as the remainder of the total salaries line item. Similarly, we assumed the cost of the Commissioners’ employee benefits in FY 2013 and FY 2014 to be fixed at the FY 2015 rate of $4,029, with Boise Fire’s share being the remainder.

A final budget allocation assumption dealt with the Blue Card line item under Training – Recertification expenditures. The Blue Card line item is the only Recertification line item that remains the responsibility of Eagle Fire under the proposed contract. The actual cost of this line item ranges from a low of $2,641 (FY 2016) to a high of $10,080 (FY 2017). The combined cost of the remaining Recertification line items, which would be the responsibility of Boise Fire, ranged from a low of $4,704 (FY 2015) to a high of $5,287 (FY 2016). The FY 2013 and FY 2014 budgets list Recertification as a single line item, without differentiation, with an actual cost of $750 and $860, respectively. Given the low dollar amount in FY 2013 and FY 2014 compared to subsequent fiscal years, the Recertification line item in these two fiscal years was assumed to be the sole responsibility of Boise Fire.

We used an implicit price deflator (IPD) for state and local government’s gross domestic product from the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Economic Analysis National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) tables in order to calculate Eagle Fire expenses in real dollars. We adjusted the IPD from a base year of 2009 to a base year of 2012 (FY 2013). Since final numbers for 2017 were not yet available, we used the IPD from the most current quarter (Q2) as 2017’s annual IPD.

Using the least squares method, we calculated trends for Eagle Fire’s total budgeted expenditures and total actual expenditures from FY 2013 through FY 2020. We also calculated separate least squares trends for the proportion of Eagle Fire’s budget that Boise Fire would absorb in the contract-for-service and the proportion for which Eagle Fire would remain responsible.

Finally, we estimated the cost of Boise Fire’s contract-for-service over four years. Boise Fire’s February 27, 2017 proposal to the Eagle Fire Commission provided a FY 2017 total contract cost of $6,989,113 (p. 5). As part of that proposal, they also projected total personnel costs through FY 2020 (p. 6). Boise Fire based their personnel projections on an assumed annual cost increase of 3.6%. Additionally, Boise Fire assumed approximately $300,000 of additional personnel costs for FY 2017, phased out over the following two years at $150,000 each year. In order to project total contract price through FY 2020, we extended these assumptions to the entire contract using the FY 2017 proposal amount as our base. FY 2018 and FY 2019 each assumed a 3.6% cost increase over the previous year and a reduction of $150,000. FY 2020 assumed simply a 3.6% cost increase over the previous year.

Results

Nominal VS. Real Expenditures

From FY 2013 to FY 2018, the Eagle Fire Protection District’s total budgeted expenditures in current (nominal) dollars grew from $5.8 million to $7.8 million, a 35.1% increase overall. The majority of this growth occurred in FY 2017. That year saw a 18.7% increase in nominal expenditures over the prior year, attributed to additional costs in payroll salaries, professional fees, and vehicle purchases. The average nominal annual growth rate was 6.4%.

In real dollars (adjusted for inflation) during the same period, Eagle Fire’s total budgeted expenditures grew from $5.8 million in FY 2013 to $7.2 million in FY 2018, a 24.1% increase. Again, FY 2017 accounts for much of this with approximately 18% real growth over the previous year. Notably, when adjusted for
inflation, Eagle Fire’s budgeted expenditures actually declined 2.1% in FY 2018. The average real annual growth rate was 4.7%. These results are summarized in Table 1.

Actual expenditures from FY 2013 through FY 2017 saw higher rates of growth. During this period, total actual expenditures in current dollars grew from $5.3 million in FY 2013 to $7.5 million in FY 2017, a 40.6% increase. Again, the largest nominal growth occurred in FY 2017, which saw a 23.3% increase over the previous fiscal year. The average nominal annual growth rate during this time was 9.2%. In terms of real dollars, actual expenditures grew from $5.3 million in FY 2013 to $7 million in FY 2017, an overall growth rate of 32.4% and an average annual growth rate of 7.6%. Table 2 summarizes these results.

Generally, Eagle Fire’s total budget has been increasing incrementally, with only two substantial spikes—a 10.2% spike from FY 2015 to FY 2016 and an 18.7% spike from FY 2016 to FY 2017. Budgeted expenditures have been growing at an average rate of 5-6% each year, while actual expenditures have been growing at
an average rate of 8-9% each year.

Budgetary Trends

Using the least squares method to generate trends on Eagle Fire’s total budgeted expenditures from FY 2013 through FY 2018, we estimate that expenditures generally increase by $481,521.86 each year. During this period, Eagle Fire’s budget has been over the trend in FY 2013 and FY 2017, under the trend in FY 2014 through FY 2016, and fairly on trend for FY 2018. As you can see in Figure 1, we can expect Eagle Fire’s budgeted expenditures to be approximately $8.3 million in FY 2019 and $8.8 million in FY 2020.

In generating trends on total actual expenditures from FY 2013 through FY 2017, we find a larger annual increase of $498,409.60. Again, Eagle Fire’s actual expenditures have been above trend in FY 2013 and FY 2017, below trend in FY 2015 and FY 2016, and on trend in FY 2014. Consequently, we would estimate total actual expenditures to be approximately $7.5 million in FY 2018 and $8.0 million in FY 2019, as Figure 2 shows.

Contract-For-Service Budgetary Shares

The proposed contract-for-service with Boise Fire would replace a significant amount of line items in Eagle Fire’s current budget. On average, line items included in the contract price would account for approximately 86.8% of Eagle Fire’s total budgeted expenditures. This would consist of:

• 98.2% of payroll salary expenditures
• 100% of payroll taxes
• 99.5% of employee benefits
• 61.3% of administrative overhead expenditures
• 100% of district insurance costs
• 78.6% of station costs
• 24.2% of logistics expenditures
• 43.7% of logistic-vehicle expenditures
• 61.5% of training expenditures
• 100% of code enforcement expenditures
• 100% of public education expenditures

Alternatively, under the proposed contract-for-service, Eagle Fire Protection District would remain responsible for, on average, 13.2% of its current total budgeted expenditures. This would consist of:

• 1.8% of payroll salaries
• 0.5% of employee benefits
• 100% of professional fees
• 38.7% of administrative overhead
• 21.4% of station costs
• 100% of administrative office costs
• 75.8% of logistic expenditures
• 56.3% of logistic-vehicle expenditures
• 38.5% of training expenditures

When these portions of the budget are analyzed separately, from FY 2013 to FY 2018 the portion that would be Boise Fire’s responsibility has experienced an average annual growth rate of 8.4% in current dollars (from $4.6 million to $6.9 million) and 6.5% in real dollars (from $4.6 million to $6.3 million), see Table 3.

If we look at actual expenditures during the same period (excluding FY 2018), the average annual growth rates become 9.9% in current dollars ($4.4 million to $6.4 million) and 8.2% in real dollars ($4.4 million to $6.0 million), see Table 4.

On the other side, Eagle’s portion of the budgeted expenditures has experienced an average annual growth rate of 10.5% in current dollars and 9.0% in real dollars. These numbers can be slightly misleading. Despite the growth rate indicating a positive trend, in terms of dollar amounts, budgeted expenditures actually declined from $1.2 million in FY 2013 to $972,000 in FY 2018. Expenditures declined in FY 2014, FY 2015, and FY 2018 (by 42.3%, 32.7%, and 28.8%, respectively). An increase in expenditures by 127.9% in FY 2017, however, inflates the overall average. Additionally, FY 2013’s budget included capital expenditures for the construction of Eagle Fire’s administrative office, which again skews the results somewhat. Table 5 summarizes this data. When looking at actual expenditures in Table 6, we find the average annual growth rates increased to 28.0% in current dollars ($930,000 to $1.1 million) and 26.4% in real dollars ($930,000 to $1.0 million). Again, a large growth rate in FY 2017 (162.7%) skews these numbers somewhat and the actual growth rate going forward will likely be lower.

Contract-For-Service Budgetary Shares Trends

We considered the Boise and Eagle portions of the budget separately and again used the least squares method to generate trend lines in order to estimate future costs. When looking at budgeted expenditures from FY 2013 through FY 2018, the portion of the budget that would be Boise Fire’s responsibility has generally seen costs increase by $452,766.52 annually. As you can see in Figure 3, the resulting trend line for this portion of the budget almost perfectly matches the actual budgeted amounts, giving strong support for the trend line’s predictions of $7.3 million in FY 2019 and $7.8 million in FY 2020.

During the same period, Eagle’s portion of budgeted expenditures has generally seen an annual increase of $28,755.34. Again, looking at Figure 3, we can see the effect of FY 2013 and FY 2017 pulling the trend line higher than it otherwise would have been. Even so, FY 2018 expenditures are again on the trend line, leaving
us confident in its estimates of approximately $983,000 in FY 2019 and $1.0 million in FY 2020.

Figure 3 plots both Boise’s and Eagle’s portions of budgeted expenditures and their respective trend lines alongside the anticipated cost of the contract-for-service. Based on the trend analysis, the proposed contract-for-service would constitute an increased cost for its first two years (an added $550,000 in year one and $199,000 in year two), but a cost savings in years three and four ($149,000 and $342,000, respectively). Assuming these trends hold, subsequent years could realize cost savings, as well. We note that the projected cost of Boise’s contract relies on their assumption of a 3.6% annual cost increase, rather than the observed 8.4% average annual increase of these line items currently. Should the final contract price include an annual cost increase greater than 3.6%, the threshold at which cost savings are realized may change.

By looking at actual expenditures for FY 2013 through FY 2017 instead of budgeted expenditures, our trend estimates change slightly (see Figure 4). The least squares trend indicates that Boise’s portion of the budget increases by $461,959.80 annually, projecting actual costs of $6.7 million in FY 2018, $7.2 million in FY 2019, and $7.6 million in FY 2020. While not as perfectly as the budgeted amounts, the actual expenditures remain fairly close to our trend line.

Eagle’s portion of actual expenditures, conversely, increases by $36,449.79 annually according to the trend analysis. While this is still influenced by the higher costs of FY 2013 and FY 2017, the overall trend remains fairly flat and projects actual expenditures of $763,000 in FY 2018, $799,000 in FY 2019, and $836,000 in FY 2020.

Once again, Figure 4 plots both Boise’s and Eagle’s portions of actual expenditures and their respective trend lines alongside Boise Fire’s anticipated contract-for-service cost. By using actual expenditures instead of budgeted expenditures, the threshold where Eagle Fire realizes cost savings is pushed out to year four. Under these projections, year one of the contract would see $733,000 in additional costs, year two $372,000, and year three $15,000. Conversely, year four would see $187,000 in cost savings. Again, if trends hold, subsequent years could realize further cost savings. As before, estimates for Boise Fire’s contract price rely upon the assumption of a 3.6% annual increase rather than the observed 9.9% average annual rate.

On the basis of these trend analyses, we expect that the Boise contract-for-service proposal would constitute an added cost for the Eagle Fire Protection District in at least its first two years of existence and a cost savings by year four, provided current trends hold. Whether year three represents an increase or savings is unclear. These findings may underscore the importance contract negotiations will play in any arrangement between Eagle and Boise, as these savings estimates are predicated on Boise committing to no more than a 3.6% annual cost increase.

Contract-For-Service One-Time Costs

The preceding analysis only takes into account Eagle’s annual budgetary costs. With the contract-for-service, a necessary component would be for Boise Fire to absorb all current Eagle Fire line personnel. Depending on when this process is completed, it could add several one-time costs to the final price. Eagle Fire Command Staff have currently identified at least four one-time costs associated with the shift in personnel from Eagle to Boise, for a total one-time cost of $2,741,499, summarized in Table 7.

The total amount of $2.7 million represents 34.9% of Eagle Fire’s total FY 2018 budget, so it is a substantial amount. Approximately $1.4 million of this is the cost to leave existing agreements early, which can be mitigated by holding off on formally transferring personnel into Boise Fire’s organization until the terms of the original agreements expire. Admittedly, this could limit the benefits of the consolidation in its early years and shift the cost-savings threshold to a later date, but it is one way to lessen the financial burden of the contract-for-service.

The remaining $1.3 million represents accumulated leave time that Eagle Fire personnel are owed under the current Collective Labor Agreement with Eagle Fire Local 4553. As part of the stakeholder analysis of this study, we met with the Executive Board of Local 4553 and they indicated a willingness to negotiate this payout, potentially spreading the burden of this one-time cost over multiple years. Once again, this could mitigate costs.

Additional one-time costs are possible with respect to equipment. One of the perceived benefits of fire service consolidation is unified training and equipment, which requires that equipment actually be uniform. For example, representatives from North Ada County Fire and Rescue indicated a need to replace all hose nozzles when they merged with Boise Fire, as their existing equipment was incompatible. Since the compatibility of fire service equipment between Eagle Fire and Boise Fire is currently unknown, we are unable to estimate an associated cost. In the event of a contract-for-service, we would suggest that an audit of each organization’s equipment be done in order to determine what those costs may be and then
negotiate a timetable to schedule those replacements over a period of years to reduce the financial burden to the Eagle Fire Protection District.

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Stakeholder Analysis

At the outset of this study, the Eagle Fire Commission identified several stakeholder groups that a contract-for-service with the Boise Fire Department would likely affect. These included Eagle Fire Command Staff, Eagle Firefighters, the Eagle Firefighters Local 4553, the City of Eagle, the Eagle Police Department, the Boise Fire Department, the Star Fire Department, the Whitney Fire District, the North Ada County Fire and Rescue District, and Eagle planned communities such as Avimor. The intent was for us to meet with as many of these stakeholders as possible and collect their thoughts and perspective on the potential contract-for service.

Boise State University’s Institutional Review Board, which is concerned with the protection of volunteers in research projects, reviewed and approved our research protocol (IRB # 042-SB17-109) prior to our commencing fieldwork. In order to protect the anonymity of participants and ensure the collection of frank and honest feedback, individual participants are not identified and findings are only reported in aggregate and attributed to the stakeholder group to which the participant belongs.

We contacted stakeholders individually by email in order to arrange interview sessions. These sessions took place from June 2017 through August 2017 in closed room environments at either the stakeholder’s own office or at the Idaho Policy Institute’s (IPI) offices in downtown Boise. We used the same set of interview questions with each stakeholder and asked them to identify the most important thing (in their opinion) about the proposed consolidation, how they felt Eagle’s resources would be affected, what they were most concerned about, and to identify what they felt were the positives and the negatives of the proposal. Two IPI researchers took separate handwritten notes during these meetings, which we compared against one another in order to ensure accuracy. We then reviewed our meeting notes to identify common themes and areas of concern.

Given the size of the Eagle Firefighters stakeholder group—arguably the most affected by the proposed consolidation—we took a different, two pronged approach to ensure we captured the full breadth of their viewpoint. The first prong consisted of two focus group sessions. Random participants were chosen in the following manner. First, the Eagle Fire Department provided us an electronic spreadsheet of all its current personnel and their email addresses. Using Microsoft Excel, all Eagle Fire Department employees (excluding Command Staff) were assigned a random number between 0 and 1. We then re-sorted this list according to the random numbers. In order to facilitate meaningful discussion, we capped focus groups to eight participants. We assigned the first eight firefighters listed to focus group #1, the second eight to focus group #2, and the third eight as potential alternates. We then contacted those identified via email in order to coordinate their participation—if someone indicated they were unable to attend, we then contacted an alternate.

The first focus group ultimately had five participants and included personnel from the Battalion Chief level down. The second focus group had seven participants and included personnel from the Captain level down. We conducted these focus group sessions in Eagle at a neutral location in order to ensure that participants felt free to share their views.

Following these focus group sessions, we initiated the second prong of our approach. We fielded an online electronic survey to all Eagle Fire employees, including Command Staff but excluding the Eagle Fire Chief. The online questionnaire consisted of the same questions used during the focus group sessions, with added prompts to think in terms of the effect on specific stakeholder groups. All responses were open ended. The survey was in the field for two weeks in July 2017. Of the 47 employees invited to participate, we collected 21 responses—a 44.7% response rate. We then reviewed responses in order to identify common areas of concern and overall themes and compared them to the focus group responses.

Eagle Firefighters

The viewpoints offered by Eagle Firefighters were diverse, with some solidly in favor of the proposed consolidation, several unsure, and some opposed. Most were open to the idea, provided it made sense and resulted in better service for the community. While the full breadth of their responses varied, as seen in Tables 8 and 9, most of the responses we heard or received focused around five major themes: (1) Citizens and the Community; (2) Resources; (3) Border/Jurisdiction Disputes; (4) Trust; and (5) Identity/Control.

1) Citizens and the Community

For each group we spoke with, the most important thing about the proposal was that the community they serve and its citizens came first. Eagle Firefighters felt it was critical that any deal between Eagle and Boise result in better service delivery for the citizens of the Eagle Fire Protection District, with most saying that if it did not, then it was not worth doing. Uncertainty over how the contract-for-service would affect Eagle taxpayers’ burden was also a concern. Obviously if their long-term burden is reduced, the deal would be looked at positively, but some expressed concern over a taxpayer’s burden increasing if many of the public works roles Eagle Fire currently fills decline.

For many, the issue is not purely cost-related, but whether the deal results in better service delivery for the end user. Some expressed personal concerns that Eagle’s growth is fast outstripping Eagle Fire’s ability to provide service at a consistent level and feel that the deal with Boise is a way to address this and ensure that service to the public does not decline in the future.

2) Resources

The second major theme of Firefighter responses all orbited the area of Department resources. When asked to identify the positives of the Boise proposal, most Firefighters cited access to more personnel to ensure that there are no coverage gaps when other stations respond to calls or are undergoing drills. Along similar lines, they also pointed out that having access to a larger personnel pool would allow them to fill vacant positions more easily. Access to Boise’s training facility would relieve Eagle Fire of the burden of having to build one of its own, would unify Eagle and Boise training standards, and help standardize equipment and operating procedures to create a unified workforce. Additionally, there was a sense that economies of scale would relieve some of the financial pressure associated with replacing and repairing equipment.

Beyond personnel and training, Firefighters also cited gaining access to more specialized teams and support departments (like HR and legal) as a positive of the deal. Several stressed that, in their view, this effect was a two way street—the addition of Eagle Firefighters, who all have swiftwater training, would also enhance Boise’s resources.

Firefighters did express some concern over Eagle Fire losing control over where it deploys its resources, as Boise Fire would control such operational decisions under the proposal. Multiple respondents specifically cited the fate of Truck 41 and expressed concern that Boise would shift it out of Eagle, if not immediately then within a few years of the deal.

For most of the Firefighters we spoke with, the resources theme and the citizens theme go hand in hand. For them, access to better resources is a way to increase service delivery to the citizens and justify the Eagle/Boise consolidation, at least in a best-case scenario.

3) Border/Jurisdiction Disputes

One of the more unexpected issues we heard during the course of this study concerned fire response in the areas around Eagle and Boise’s borders. Eagle Firefighters described numerous situations where Eagle Fire personnel are deployed in response to an emergency because they were the closest available unit, only to be called off minutes later by Boise Fire. In most cases, this adds additional minutes to the response time. In one specific case, shared with us by multiple Eagle Firefighters, an Eagle vehicle was making station purchases across the street from the location of an emergency call (the street in question serves as a boundary between Eagle and Boise’s jurisdictions). Despite offers, instead of allowing Eagle to respond to the call, Boise chose to wait for their own engine to get there-deployed from approximately 4 miles away.

The Eagle Firefighters who participated in this study uniformly expressed frustration at these types of situations, as well as their frequency, as they feel prevented from being able to do their job and help the public. Furthermore, it helped create a false public perception that Eagle Firefighters were ignoring a fire just across the street, when in fact they could not respond. The Firefighters noted that some of their frustration stemmed from the fact that this pattern is inconsistent—they felt that some Boise Battalion Chiefs were open to working together, while some were not, and their usage was dependent on who was on duty at the time. They also indicated that Eagle and Boise line personnel got along fine.

While Eagle Firefighters were discussing this very issue during one of our focus group sessions, an emergency call from the border area along Chinden Boulevard came in. Our group heard the radio call and the deployment of an Eagle engine in response, as it was the closest available unit. Within a few minutes, Boise called off the Eagle engine in favor of a Boise unit farther away. The focus group participants all noted that this was a common occurrence.

In later discussions with the Eagle Firefighters Local 4553, they indicated that one of the reasons for these difficulties is that Eagle has a Joint Powers Agreement (JPA) with Boise for EMS issues when a life is threatened, but not for general fire service activities. In the case of the fire across the street, it was not flagged as a life-threatening event, so Eagle was not automatically deployed under the JPA.

For many of the Firefighters, they view the contract-for-service as a way of mitigating this issue. By placing Eagle and Boise Firefighters under the same operational umbrella, their hope is that these border disputes and jurisdictional concerns will vanish and both organizations can focus on what really matters—responding to the public emergencies as quickly and efficiently as possible. We should note that a contract-for-service is not the only way to mitigate this issue, but it is certainly a direct way.

4) Trust

Another common theme among responses dealt with matters of trust, specifically between Eagle Firefighters and the Eagle Fire Commission.

There was repeated discussion in both focus groups and the online survey that indicate distrust between Eagle Fire line personnel and the Eagle Fire Commission. Some bluntly said just that. More specifically, they questioned whether the Commission is open to the proposal or simply “going through the motions” in order to placate its employees. Some expressed concern that the Commission would only look at a dollar amount, rather than the relative cost of increased service. A few expressed feelings that Commissioners’ personal investment in the Eagle Fire Department clouds their perception.

Based on some of the public meetings we have attended, we do not believe this is a surprise to the Commission. Enough Firefighters mentioned it during both the focus groups and the online survey that we want to highlight it as an area for organizational improvement, no matter what the eventual decision vis-àvis consolidation actually is.

5) Identity/Control

As touched on earlier in this study, one of the most common negatives cited in any consolidation is a loss of identity for the consolidating entities. Eagle Firefighters articulated this as a loss of Eagle’s small town identity and a loss of Eagle Fire’s departmental identity. This came up repeatedly throughout our study, with some Firefighters highlighting it as a serious concern that would negatively affect the Eagle Fire Department, while others felt it was less important, more of a tangential issue that contract negotiation can address through symbolic gestures like maintaining different logos on Eagle Fire uniforms or keeping the color of the trucks yellow.

A few of the Firefighters noted that the small department feel and the ability to make quick course corrections helped draw them to Eagle Fire. There is a perception that Eagle Fire is more engaged with its community than Boise Fire is with theirs and a fear that being absorbed by Boise may limit their ability to continue that engagement at the same level.

On the other side of the argument, some of the Firefighters felt that losing the ability to make quick decisions on less consequential matters is a justified tradeoff given the service increase likely to take place under a contract-for-service. They also feel that Eagle Fire has already retreated from its identity, citing the end of the Rocky Mountain Oyster Feed. As one Firefighter said bluntly, “the only tradition the Eagle Fire Department has is change.”

Other Eagle Stakeholders

Of the remaining stakeholders, three are specifically located in Eagle and closely tied to the Eagle Fire Department—contractually, in identity, or in partnership. The Eagle Firefighters Local 4553, City of Eagle, and Eagle Police Department have unique vantage points relative to the Eagle Fire Department. Tables 10 and 11 summarize their views on the contract-for-service proposal and its impact, while more detail is provided below.

Eagle Firefighters Local 4553

The views of Eagle Firefighters Local 4553 mostly mirrored those we heard from Eagle Firefighters themselves, with the Local generally more in favor of the proposal than the wider group. They shared many of the same concerns and motivations—that the deal result in better service for citizens and taxpayers, that efficiencies result in more cost savings, and that border issues between Eagle and Boise should decline when both are part of the same organizational hierarchy.

As a labor union, they naturally view their mission as being primarily concerned about the wages and working conditions of their members. On wages, they feel having access to Boise’s health trust would enhance the benefits offered to Eagle Fire personnel, as would having access to career development opportunities. On working conditions, they feel that the Boise proposal will help provide their members with a safe working environment by ensuring that there is adequate staffing throughout the organization. Additionally, with access to Boise personnel, Eagle would not have to worry about coverage or staffing during drills, training, or mandatory meetings. There would also be an ability to fill vacancies from like positions.

Perhaps the most significant finding related to Local 4553 is that they have already agreed to terms with IAFF Local 149 (Boise’s firefighter union) on merging the two organizations. As one Local representative noted, they stand ready to begin the process once the Eagle Fire Commission makes its decision. Additionally, as noted during the financial analysis, Local 4553 indicated a willingness to negotiate with Eagle Fire regarding the timetable for paying out leave balances and exiting existing agreements in order to help reduce the one-time financial costs associated with the proposal.

City of Eagle

The City of Eagle largely expressed concern over the proposed contract-for-service. Their representative admitted that they did not know much about the proposal, but their perception was that disgruntled employees and increased pay and benefits for Eagle Firefighters was driving it.

They emphasized the good working relationship they currently have with the Eagle Fire Department, and specifically lauded the efforts of the Department and Firefighters during the past winter (“snowmageddon”) to help clear streets of snow and ice. They noted anecdotally that they had heard Boise Fire had not engaged at the same level and were therefore concerned that there would consequently be a service reduction in any arrangement with Boise. The City of Eagle further noted that the current Eagle Fire Chief has been attending the City’s directors meetings to engage and coordinate with the City. There is concern that under a contract-for-service this engagement might cease, based on Eagle’s historical relationship with
Boise. Most of the City’s feedback expressed a wariness of trading a known, good working relationship for an unknown one with a different actor.

The City also expressed concern that the added cost of the Boise proposal would mean one of two things: (1) either taxes on City residents go up to help cover these added costs or (2) services go away to help reduce costs. Neither option was palatable to them.

The City acknowledged that Eagle Fire could have access to a larger resource pool under the deal, but felt that the tradeoff would be too great. Again, the overriding sentiment expressed by the City was that they are happy with the current working relationship with the Eagle Fire Department and they would rather not trade that close and friendly relationship for one with Boise.

Eagle Police Department

The Eagle Police Department (EPD) occupies a rather unique space relative to this study. While not itself an example of service-consolidation, it is the result of a service contract between the City of Eagle and the Ada County Sheriff’s Office. As such, it has some experience existing within a larger service organization (ACSO) with its own chain of command, while also serving the City of Eagle with theirs.

Similar to other stakeholders, the Eagle Police Department emphasized the effect the deal will have on citizens. They enumerated four overriding goals for any contract-for-service: (1) For the citizens of Eagle to feel that it gives them the best service; (2) That the culture represents the values of Eagle’s past; (3) That it is cost effective; and (4) That it is the right thing to do.

EPD also emphasized the proposal’s effect on Eagle’s identity, expressing a preference to maintain the small town feel and the historical culture of Eagle. The Eagle Fire Department’s longevity in the community means that they have developed a distinct community identity—including the history of the nut feed, blood pressure checks at stations, and yellow trucks, to name a few—that ties them to the City of Eagle and the Eagle Community. EPD would not want to see them lose that identity or connection.

Having said that, EPD noted that their experience coordinating with Eagle Fire and Boise Fire on flood mitigation earlier this year has made them more at ease with this type of proposal than they otherwise would have been. They noted that there are some emergencies, like the flooding, that Eagle would not be able to handle alone. At the time of the interview, the three agencies—and others—had been connected and coordinating for three months with success. EPD felt that if the contract-for-service could mirror this arrangement, it could be successful, but cautions that it will take great discipline to maintain.

Other Stakeholders

We also met with other stakeholders whom the Eagle Fire Commission’s decision will ultimately affect. Boise Fire Department, obviously, would be party to any contract-for-service. Star Fire Department is one of the Eagle Fire Department’s nearest neighbors with a long working relationship. Finally, changes in service
delivery will also affect the regional planned communities in Eagle and Eagle’s area of impact. The views of one of these communities—Avimor—are included in our analysis. We discuss each in turn below, while Tables 12 and 13 summarize their views on the proposal.

Boise Fire Department

As the author of the contract-for-service proposal, the Boise Fire Department (BFD) is naturally supportive of it. Again, they feel that the focus needs to be on the citizens and emphasize that good government is the most important driver of this deal; providing better service for less cost. Boise Fire sees many of the same benefits cited by the Eagle Firefighters, buttressed by their experience of having gone through this process already with Whitney Fire District and North Ada County Fire and Rescue. Specifically, they see the benefits for Eagle as giving access to specialized teams, career development for its firefighters, logistical support, and better compensation. By integrating Eagle Fire into their entire fire service system, Eagle would gain access to economies of scale and resources for less cost than building such a system on their own.

BFD acknowledges that loss of identity concerns are common in these arrangements and emphasized that they have a history of working to mitigate these concerns and have found a good middle ground with both Whitney and North Ada County that they can replicate in Eagle. Also from these experiences, BFD feels they can aid organizations like Eagle with long term strategic planning by leading discussions with supporting analytics that other Departments might not have.

They also see an opportunity for Boise to benefit from the deal. Apart from expanding their own resources by adding Eagle personnel, they noted that Boise’s Fire Prevention division is at a tipping point. Currently understaffed, an influx of Eagle personnel could help stabilize it and increase service delivery to both Boise and Eagle.

From Boise’s perspective, the biggest obstacle to consolidation is the short-term minutiae of actually negotiating the specifics of the contract. They fully believe this can be overcome and are confident that, in the long term, the two organizations will become seamless.

Star Fire Department

The Star Fire Department (SFD) generally took a more guarded view. From their perspective, the most important aspect of the deal is maintaining a good working relationship between Eagle Fire and Star Fire.

Star expressed concern that Boise’s management would not be as engaged as Eagle currently is and would be less willing to work with surrounding jurisdictions. They specifically noted that the Fire Chiefs of Eagle, Star, Meridian, Middleton, Kuna, Nampa, and Caldwell have all been meeting regularly to update each other and coordinate their activities where possible. Despite invitations, Boise Fire has not attended, which contributes to a feeling that Boise feels it does not need them. Like with the City of Eagle, there is wariness over trading a good existing relationship for an uncertain one with an actor that, thus far, has not been as engaged or as easy to work with.

While Star complimented Eagle on its management of its resources, it suggested the benefits of consolidation would be minimal and possibly short-lived. There is an expectation that Boise would reallocate Eagle’s current resources within a few years.

Regional Planned Communities (Avimor)

As a regional planned community that straddles both Eagle and Eagle’s area-of-impact, Avimor is particularly concerned with how the proposed contract-for-service could affect them. With experience dealing with the City of Eagle, the City of Boise, and the Eagle Fire Protection District, an Avimor representative felt they had a good idea of the different styles of each entity and expressed a strong preference for the Eagle Fire Department.

For Avimor, the most important thing about any contract-for-service is maintaining current levels of fire protection service. They feel that would be more difficult under a contract-for-service with Boise, in part because higher labor costs would limit Eagle’s ability to manage its resources and provide service. As it specifically relates to them, Avimor feels that Eagle’s approach towards managing growth in the foothills (such as their own community) is superior to Boise’s approach. Specifically, Eagle charges a mitigation fee that goes towards the construction of a new station once call volume for the area necessitates it, while Boise calls for adding services like fire protection up front. There is a concern that, under a contract-for-service, Boise’s approach could take precedence.

In their dealings with both Boise and Eagle, Avimor expressed a strong preference for Eagle, feeling that the City of Boise is Boise-focused and has no regional vision for the Treasure Valley at large, which (since it is a part of the City) is potentially a view that trickles down to the Boise Fire Department.

They acknowledge that typically combined resources make for a stronger organization, but do not feel it would be so in this instance. Eventually, you would see a relationship similar to the one that exists between cities and the Ada County Highway District, where Eagle will feel it is not receiving as much attention as Boise by the system that serves them both.

Lessons Learned: Whitney and North Ada County

One of the unique aspects of the Eagle/Boise contract-for-service proposal is the fact that Boise Fire has undergone this process before—with the Whitney Fire Protection District in 2001 and with the North Ada County Fire and Rescue District (NACFR) in 2009. This gives the Eagle Fire Commission two concrete examples of what these consolidations look like, how they were received, and what lessons can be learned.

The circumstances of contracting-for-service were different in both cases, but followed a similar rationale. Whitney, for instance, already existed within Boise’s area of impact and consolidation made sense. At the time, principals viewed it as an opportunity to put discussions of consolidation into practice and avail themselves of its benefits. Likewise, NACFR was motivated by many of those same benefits—strength in numbers, better coverage, and less expense.

Unlike Whitney, NACFR is geographically located between Boise’s and Eagle’s jurisdictions. While now part of Boise Fire’s organization, during our meeting NACFR felt it shares more risk types with Eagle Fire, due to the prominence of the foothills in both districts. In some respects, they see adding Eagle to Boise’s organizational umbrella as an opportunity to enhance the attention paid to foothills strategic planning by the organization.

Our meetings with Whitney and NACFR contained numerous pieces of advice and shared experiences that could benefit the Eagle Fire Commission’s deliberations. What follows are the ten overriding lessons gleaned from their experiences contracting-for-service with Boise Fire, summarized in Table 14. We present them in no particular order.

1) Two Different Languages

One of the items stakeholders emphasized is the fact that Fire Districts and municipal departments are two different things. More succinctly, they noted that “District Speak” is different from “City Speak.” Each entity budgets (or has to budget) in different ways and it is important to recognize where they share a common language and where they differ. When you mix two entities, each actor approaches issues from their own perspective and can miss the limitations under which their partner has to operate (or which they think their partner has to operate). For districts that are accustomed to functioning with close collaboration between their Fire Departments and Fire Commissions, this change can be especially jarring. That said, there are benefits, as well. As one stakeholder noted, as a municipal department, Boise Fire has access to municipal grant funding that the Eagle Fire Protection District does not. The important thing is recognizing that districts and municipalities are two different entities and there will be an adjustment period.

2) Chain of Command

Related to the previous lesson, it is important to understand that a contract-for-service changes the organizational chain of command immensely. One of the stakeholders entered into the agreement with Boise Fire thinking that their current Fire Chief would transition to serve as a liaison between their District and Boise. Following the consolidation, the Fire Chief became a Division Chief for Boise and could no longer go outside of Boise’s chain of command to communicate directly with the District Commission. Similarly, under a contract-for-service, most Eagle Fire personnel would become employees of the City of Boise and would no longer be able to communicate directly with the Eagle Fire Commission unless directed to do so by their superiors at Boise. This is understandable from both organization’s perspective. As one of the stakeholders put it, “you can’t serve two masters.”

3) A District Advocate

Both stakeholders felt it was important to have someone at the District serving as an advocate for their interests and monitoring contract costs closely. In one example, a stakeholder noted that a line item on their invoices, “Ancillary City Services,” included costs for City of Boise art projects. Had they not pursued
clarification on what was included in that line item, taxpayers in their District would have been subsidizing art projects for a city they did not live in, unrelated to fire prevention—certainly something the Fire District had never intended. That stakeholder emphasized the importance of having a “bulldog” administrator to
follow up on financial matters.

4) Communication is Key

It is important to maintain good communication between all parties during the process, from the Commission to Command Staff to line personnel to other organizations. In order for a contract-for-service to succeed, everyone needs to be on board and included in the process. Towards that end, keeping that process as transparent and as open as you can is critical.

5) Culture

With any consolidation, cultural issues will arise. Each institution has existed long enough to have its own unique organizational culture or “way of doing things.” No matter how appropriate they are for those individual organizations, once the entities merge they must find a new equilibrium. Longtime employees are likely to be more resistant to this, because it constitutes a change from “how we’ve always done it.” One stakeholder found that most of this resistance was concentrated in their higher ranks, those whose service time had made them invested in the District’s individual identity. In contrast, they felt that most of the line personnel were fine with the consolidation and adapted quickly. It is important to recognize that a consolidation is a process, one that does not happen overnight and that smooths out over time.

6) Importance of Contract Negotiation & Specificity

Another aspect that these stakeholders emphasized is specificity in contract negotiation. They asserted that Eagle must drill down into the hard details of any arrangement and, above all, must be specific. Each aspect of the agreement must be in writing and they underscored the need to hold fast and make sure Eagle’s agenda is included in the contract. They also advised to define exactly what fire prevention looks like under the arrangement, pointing out that Boise’s fire prevention division is understaffed and was the one area they felt hurt their organization in the consolidation. (As noted in the earlier stakeholder analysis, Boise Fire admits prevention is understaffed and see addressing that as one of the potential benefits of the proposal.) More importantly, stakeholders indicated that Eagle must have the mindset that Boise Fire works for them under this arrangement, not the reverse—something they admit they had difficulty realizing, at first.

7) Let the Unions Work It Out Themselves

When it comes to how matters of seniority, promotions, or merging the two labor unions are concerned, both Whitney and NACFR recommended leaving those details and negotiations to the Unions themselves. As one stakeholder explained, the unions then own the result. It is impossible to make every union member happy in any consolidation, so the next best thing is an agreement both sides can live with. As we noted earlier in our stakeholder analysis, our understanding is that the Eagle Firefighters Local 4553 and IAFF Local 149 have already agreed on terms for consolidation.

8) An Operational Voice

One of the more significant complaints we heard from these stakeholders was the lack of voice in operational matters. In part, that is by design. The very nature of a contract-for-service is that you are paying another entity to handle operational concerns and you exert your influence by either continuing to award them the
contract or not. At the same time, operational decisions can and will affect Fire Districts financially. For example, one stakeholder shared that, following implementation of their contract, Boise Fire decided to upgrade their systems to use dark fiber. As a result, the contracting District also had to upgrade their facilities to dark fiber. While Boise gave them notice, the District was not included in the decision-making process.

This stakeholder in particular feels there is a need for each jurisdiction included under Boise Fire’s umbrella (Boise, Whitney, NACFR, and, if included, Eagle) to have some representation at the staff level. Whether this is a dedicated staff position or an advisory council with representatives from the District Commissions, the sense is that contracting jurisdictions should have a seat at the table during operational discussions as-they-happen, rather than being informed after the fact and leaving them with the associated financial cost. In this respect, stakeholders see the Eagle proposal as an opportunity to negotiate this matter and possibly include previous contract-for-service entities like them in the process.

9) Planning Horizon

Another important lesson is that the Districts’ planning horizons shift under a contract-for-service. Under the contract, Eagle would become part of a much larger fire system comprised of four fire protection entities. This necessarily changes the way the Eagle Fire Commission would have to manage its District. As one stakeholder put it, “Everything takes longer and costs more.” Adapting to these changes will be critical for Eagle.

10) Evaluation

Among the unique positions both Whitney and NACFR find themselves in, they are both able to reflect on years of experience working with Boise Fire under a contract-for-service arrangement and evaluate how it has worked out for them. While neither arrangement has been perfect, both stakeholders indicated they were generally satisfied with the result and would do it again.

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Summary

The research question that guided our study was, “What are the impacts of Eagle fire service consolidation with Boise Fire Department?” As previous sections have shown, the answer to that question is complicated. There are financial impacts, service impacts, jurisdictional impacts, and cultural impacts, to name a few. Considered in a vacuum, it may be possible to take one of those areas of impact and declare a fire service consolidation positive or negative. In reality, these areas do not exist in a vacuum. They are interconnected and, therefore, you must consider them as such. The difficulty is that the question of whether consolidation is right for an organization—and right for the Eagle Fire Protection District specifically—is actually a question of trade-offs.

While it is possible to realize cost-savings or improved service in some areas of the organization, added costs or decreased service elsewhere may offset them. As such, the quandary facing the Eagle Fire Commission is which trade-offs are acceptable, which are not, and it is that question that this study seeks to inform. The preceding literature review, financial analysis, and stakeholder analysis have left us with seven major takeaways that can help this process. These are the elements we feel are most important as the Eagle Fire Commission deliberates on whether or not to proceed with the contract-for-service and should help guide the process going forward—whatever their eventual decision.

Commit to Success or Don’t Do It

That consolidating parties must be totally committed to the consolidation in order to succeed is perhaps the most important lesson from the literature. Repeated in case after case, its relevance is overwhelmingly obvious. Consolidating any two organizations is difficult and entails not only blending work forces and cultures, but establishing new chains of command. It can be a tumultuous time in the best of circumstances, but if either side is holding back and not fully committed to seeing the consolidation succeed, it will not. What’s more, dissolving consolidations midstream can be even more chaotic and lead to organizational uncertainty. For that reason, it is important for leadership to be fully committed to a successful consolidation before the process even begins, or simply not start that process at all. Beginning a consolidation halfheartedly, with an eye towards terminating the arrangement later, is a recipe for disaster.

Open Communication

Lines of communication are important. There are many stakeholder groups potentially affected by a decision to consolidate Eagle Fire and Boise Fire and, above all, they must talk to one another. They also must feel their point of view is being heard. This does not mean conceding to all of their demands, but the process must be as inclusive and transparent as possible. While we endeavored to include the most affected stakeholder groups in our study, there are others, including the community at large. If the Eagle Fire Commission decides to proceed, we would encourage them to hold public meetings on the contract-for-service proposal and use this study as a resource to educate citizens on the inherent trade-offs.

Added Value vs. Economies of Scale

Access to cost savings through economies of scale is perhaps one of the most cited reasons to consolidate fire protection organizations. Yet, it appears fire protection organizations rarely realize them. The reason is unclear—it could be because population size actually determines them or cost increases elsewhere offset them. Given this uncertainty, we would caution letting economies of scale overly influence the decision. Instead, we would suggest evaluating any proposal in terms of the marginal cost for service enhancements. Both the literature and our stakeholder analysis support this approach.

Annual Rate of Increase Matters

In terms of Boise’s specific proposal to Eagle, we stress that the year-to-year rate of increase matters a great deal. As we noted during our financial analysis, the projected cost of the Boise contract assumes a 3.6% annual expenditure increase (per their own personnel estimates), when the historical average annual rates for those portions of Eagle’s budget are 8.4% (budgeted) and 9.9% (actual). This reduced annual rate is what produces a cost-savings for Eagle by year four of the proposal. If we adjust our projections to use the observed average annual growth rates instead, there would be no cost savings for Eagle. In fact, the gap between our trend line and the proposal cost widens with each additional year. For this reason,
negotiating a contract with Boise that includes an average annual growth rate that produces a long-term cost savings is vital to the financial viability of this proposal.

The Contract is Paramount

Along similar lines, the specifics of the contract are paramount. The terms of the contract are the only avenue that the Eagle Fire Protection District controls through negotiation with Boise. As the Eagle Fire Commission thinks in terms of trade-offs, many of the variables related to them must be addressed in the contract itself. If having staff-level representation in Boise Fire for operational decisions is important to the Eagle Fire Commission, it needs to be included at the contract stage. If maintaining organizational identity is important, again, it needs to be included at the contract stage. Once terms have been agreed to, it is also important the Eagle Fire Protection District have at least one employee whose responsibilities include monitoring the contract and all related expenses to ensure the costs to the District are appropriate and in keeping with those terms.

Work With Local 4553 to Mitigate One-Time Costs

As mentioned during both our financial analysis and stakeholder analysis, the largest financial barrier to a contract-for-service are the one-time costs (i.e., leave balance payouts, early withdrawal penalties, etc.). Eagle Firefighters Local 4553 indicated a willingness to negotiate ways to help mitigate those costs. If the Eagle Fire Commission decides to proceed with the consolidation, they should work with Local 4553 to determine specifics early in the process.

Keep the Citizen in the Forefront

Finally, keep the citizens of the Eagle Fire Protection District in the forefront. This was something emphasized by each stakeholder we met with: the citizens come first. Remember that the goal of fire consolidation is to deliver those citizens the best service possible in the most economical way possible. If Eagle decides to pursue a contract-for-service, they should keep those citizens in mind and involve them in the process as much as possible.

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References

• Bert, W. (2002). Funding the fire service in the new millennium. (Applied research project.) School of Fire Staff and Command Program: Monroe, MI.
• Bish, R. L. (2001). “Local government amalgamations: Discredited nineteenth-century ideals alive in the twenty-first.” C. D. Howe Institute Commentary (150), pp. 1-35.
• Bradshaw, N. A. (2007). Patterns of cost allocation strategies: A look at cooperative fire departments in the state of Michigan. (Master’s thesis.) Michigan State University.
• Corroon, P. (2005). “Salt Lake County government: Creating synergy, success, and efficiency for the next ten years.” Hinckley Journal of Politics 6, pp. 63-66.
• Couch, J. F., King, B. A., Gossett, C. H. & Parris, J. B. (2004). “Economies of scale and the provision of public goods by municipalities.” Journal of Economics and Economic Education Research, 5(3), pp. 67-79.
• Duncombe, W. & Yinger, J. (1993). “An analysis of returns to scale in public production, with an application to fire protection.” Journal of Public Economics 52(?), pp. 49-72.
• Fox, W. F. & Gurley, T. (2006). “Will consolidation improve sub-national governments?” (Policy research working paper; World Bank). [Retrieved from http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/decentralization/
  decentralizationcorecourse2006/OtherReadings/FoxGurley.pdf]
• Frazier, G. (1998). “A solution for increased efficiency and service consolidation: A feasibility study on consolidation between Hutchinson fire department and Reno county fire district #2.” (Applied research project.) National Fire Academy Executive Fire Officer Program: Hutchinson, KS.
• Maher, C. S. (2015). “A longitudinal analysis of the effects of service consolidation on local government expenditures.” Public Administration Quarterly, Sept. 2015, pp. 393-425.
• McGrath, T. (1995). “Attitudes of fire chiefs and public officials towards consolidation of the fire protection in Lake county, Illinois.” (Doctoral dissertation.) Walden University.
• Mellinger, R., Minton, T. & Driscoll, S. (2008). “The city of Sparks’ perspective on
  consolidation.” (White paper.) Sparks, NV. [Retrieved from http://portal.cityofsparks.us/media/mt30kxts5qruzjfpeoy2ek4p/20081110%20Sparks%20Consolidation%20Summary.pdf]
• Public Safety Solutions, Inc. (2011). “A fire district consolidation study: Township of Monroe, New Jersey.” (PDF document.) [Retrieved from http://www.monroetwp.com/Files/1552.pdf]
• Vojnovic, I. (2000). “Municipal consolidation, regional planning and fiscal accountability: The recent experience in two maritime provinces.” Canadian Journal of Regional Science, 23(1), pp. 49-72.
• Workman, N. (2004). “Unified fire authority: Overcoming turf battles for the benefit of the citizens.” Hinckley Journal of Poilitics 5, pp. 35-37.

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Appendix A: Trend Analysis Tables

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Appendix B: Interview and Focus Group Question Pool

1. What about the Eagle/Boise proposal is most important to you?
2. How do you feel Eagle’s resources are going to be impacted by contracting with Boise Fire Department?
3. What do you see as positives of the Eagle/Boise proposal?
4. What do you see as negatives of the Eagle/Boise proposal?
5. What are your primary concerns about the deal?
6. What kind of service level would you like to see with regard to the Eagle Fire Department and the City of Eagle? (i.e., maintain existing levels, scale back, or expand)
7. How do you think a contract for service would affect that level?
8. Any other comments?

Online Survey Questionnaire

1. What about the Eagle/Boise proposal is most important to you?
2. How do you feel Eagle’s resources are going to be impacted by contracting with the Boise Fire Department?
3. What do you see as positives of the Eagle/Boise proposal for the City of Eagle?
4. What do you see as negatives of the Eagle/Boise proposal for the City of Eagle?
5. What do you see as positives of the Eagle/Boise proposal for the Eagle Fire Department?
6. What do you see as negatives of the Eagle/Boise proposal for the Eagle Fire Department?
7. What do you see as positives of the Eagle/Boise proposal for Eagle Firefighters?
8. What do you see as negatives of the Eagle/Boise proposal for Eagle Firefighters?
9. What are your primary concerns about the Eagle/Boise proposal?
10. What kind of service level (outside of fire protection) would you like to see with regard to the Eagle Fire Department and the City of Eagle? (i.e., maintain existing levels, scale back, or expand)
11. How do you think a contract-for-service would affect that level?
12. What do you think are the strengths of the Eagle Fire Department in working with the community?
13. What do you think needs to be improved by the Eagle Fire Department in working with the community?
14. Any other comments?